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I. INTRODUCTION
 This Article builds on the premise that our legal system is an in-
strumental enterprise aimed at solving social coordination problems. 
Tort law, the special focus here, consists of a core of civil regulations 
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that impose public solutions to coordination problems relating to the 
creation and management of risk.1 This Article examines the regula-
tive dimensions of tort from a problem-solving perspective that the 
author and others have begun to develop.2 Along with its regulative 
core, tort includes important constitutive dimensions; for example, 
within limits, persons may contract out of governmentally imposed 
tort regulations. In those instances, courts allow externally derived 
contractual arrangements to override tort. This Article explores tort’s 
constitutive dimensions by examining the hitherto underappreciated 
extent to which tort law relies internally on private ordering to solve 
coordination problems. These internal constitutive dimensions of tort 
cover a much broader spectrum than does the contracting-out phe-
nomenon. In these broader contexts, the tort system does not merely 
passively defer to contractual overrides but also actively delegates to 
private actors the power to define the norms imposed by tort law. 
 To demonstrate that law in general—and tort law in particular—are 
problem-solving enterprises, this Article begins by constructing an 
appropriate perspective. Problems involve perceived obstacles to 
achieving one’s objectives. Solving problems involves discovering 
ways to overcome the obstacles. A problem’s complexity, and thus 
difficulty, is a function of the number of relevant considerations and 
their interconnectedness. When the constituent elements of a prob-
lem are highly interconnected, it may be said to be many-centered or 
polycentric. Because the solution of polycentric problems requires the 
exercise of discretion, individuals and small collaborative groups are 
capable of solving them by drawing on experience-based intuition. By 
contrast, courts are less capable of solving polycentric problems be-
cause, according to the traditional view, they must try to avoid the 
exercise of broad discretion.3 The traditional constraints on judicial 
discretion rest in part on concerns over the judiciary’s lack of political 
accountability and, in part, on a time-honored commitment to liti-
gants that they and their lawyers be allowed to participate meaning-
fully in guiding courts to proper outcomes. 
                                                                                                                  
 1. The analysis does not insist that tort law necessarily promotes allocative efficiency; 
even a system aimed at promoting corrective justice is concerned with the instrumental 
effectiveness of the means chosen to accomplish that objective. As long as the tort system 
remains faithful to the norms of justice it is free to (and must) perform instrumental, prob-
lem-solving functions. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 621, 629-30 (2002) (noting that the instrumental goal of deterring wrongful 
conduct is compatible with a noninstrumental goal of corrective justice as long as the two are 
conceptually sequenced so that the former gives way to the latter when they come into conflict).  
 2. This author develops the problem-solving perspective in James A. Henderson, Jr., 
Contract’s Constitute Core: Solving Problems By Making Deals, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 89
(2012); See also Curtis Bridgeman, Contracts as Plans, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 341 (2009).
 3. The traditional view, sometimes honored in the breach, is that courts should apply 
preexisting law, not create new law. See nn.37-38, supra, and accompanying text. 
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 One important way that tort law avoids confronting courts with 
polycentric problems is by minimizing the extent to which tort doc-
trine relies on vague, open-textured standards. As will be demon-
strated, the tort system has largely conformed to this constraint. But 
in order for tort law to apply flexibly and sensibly to broad ranges of 
factual circumstances, some measure of vagueness in tort doctrine, 
epitomized in negligence principles, is inescapable. Thus, the other 
way that tort doctrine avoids confronting courts with polycentric 
problems is to allow the legal standards to remain open-textured but 
to delegate much of the problem-solving responsibility, implicit in 
applying those standards, to private decisionmakers. Regarding tort 
litigation, for example, courts do not so much solve the substantive 
problems presented in cases brought under vague legal standards as 
they decide which litigant’s proposed solution deserves to be implement-
ed. A favorable outcome represents not so much a judicially devised so-
lution as the implementation by the court of the successful litigant’s 
privately derived solution to the substantive problem presented.4
 Part II constructs a problem-solving perspective by setting out the 
conceptual framework: what problems are, what solutions are, and 
why it is helpful to distinguish between solving a problem and im-
plementing a solution. Part II also identifies the nature and limits of 
the decisionmaking processes by which individuals and courts solve 
problems. Part III uses these insights regarding problem solving to 
explain the various doctrines comprising tort law’s regulative dimen-
sions, including intentional torts, negligence, strict liability, and en-
terprise liability. It shows how, through a combination of rule speci-
ficity and delegation to private ordering, tort doctrine avoids present-
ing courts with unadjudicable problems. Part IV uses the problem-
solving perspectives from Parts II and III to identify and explain tort 
law’s constitutive dimensions, describing how tort doctrine empowers 
private actors to define and adjust, ex ante, the legal duties they owe 
one another and to specify, ex post, the particular ways in which 
those duties have been breached. As has been suggested, the  
analyses in Parts III and IV are connected; in many instances the 
tort doctrines that avoid assigning courts unadjudicable problems do 
so by delegating relevant problem-solving responsibilities to private  
risk managers.  
                                                                                                                  
 4. To be sure, trial courts solve procedural and evidentiary problems as they arise, 
exercising discretion in doing so. And courts solve problems when they make substantive 
law. However, as the analysis will make clear, the statement in the text regarding “sub-
stantive issues” withstands scrutiny. On that score, courts are more solution-implementers 
than problem solvers. See infra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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II.   CONSTRUCTING A PROBLEM-SOLVING PERSPECTIVE
A.   The Building Blocks: Problems, Solutions, Implementations 
 Problems are part of the human condition; solving them is central 
to life on this planet.5 Someone has a problem when she realizes that 
an obstacle is preventing her from attaining a desired objective and 
that an effective response strategy, which may reveal itself if appro-
priate efforts are undertaken, is not immediately apparent.6 The ob-
stacle itself is not the problem; rather, the problem resides in the ac-
tor’s awareness that she lacks sufficient knowledge to respond effec-
tively.7 Complexity, which contributes to making problems difficult to 
solve, is a function of the number of relevant considerations and their 
interconnectedness.8 When a problem’s elements are strongly inter-
connected, consideration of any one element necessarily requires the 
simultaneous consideration of most, or all, of the others. Thus, it may 
be said that these sorts of problems must be solved “of a whole.” 
Problems such as how to design an automobile epitomize this form of 
nonlinear interconnectedness.9 The type and size of an automobile’s 
engine interact with the type of transmission, both of which interact 
with the design of the car’s suspension, all of which affect the size 
and weight of the vehicle, which affects the gas mileage, and so on. 
Such design problems, which are often referred to as many-centered 
or polycentric,10 are centrally important when assessing the problem-
solving capacities of individuals and governmental institutions, espe-
cially the judiciary. By contrast, unicentric problems present what 
might be characterized as “more-versus-less” tasks—determining the 
size or quantity of a single variable along an essentially linear axis.11
                                                                                                                  
 5. See KARL POPPER, ALL LIFE IS PROBLEM SOLVING 100 (Patrick Camiller trans., 
1999) (“All organisms are inventors and technicians, good or not so good, successful or not 
so successful, in solving technical problems.”). 
 6. These conditions are implicated in virtually every definition advanced by leading 
researchers. See, e.g., ALLEN NEWELL & HERBERT A. SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING 72 
(1972) (“A person is confronted with a problem when he wants something and does not 
know immediately what series of actions he can perform to get it.”). 
 7. People often refer to obstacles as problems, as in “My biggest problem is that I do 
not own an automobile.” More accurately, one should say, “My problem is that I have not 
figured out how I can afford to own an automobile, or how I can manage without owning one.” 
 8. See generally ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY:
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER 15-20 (2000). 
 9. Other examples, which authors have used to make this same point, include de-
signing a football team, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 395 (1978), and decorating a home, see Henderson, supra note 2, at 100. 
 10. See Fuller, supra note 9, at 371, 394-404. 
 11. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Design Defect Litigation Revisited, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 541, 546 (1976). Determining compensatory tort damages is a good example of a uni-
centric issue. To determine an appropriate award, many contested elements may require 
consideration; but the elements are not linked to each other in a polycentric manner that 
requires their reconsideration when each element is reached, in turn. Regarding unicentric 
issues, the parties push and pull against each other, as in a tug-of-war, along a single 
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To be sure, polycentric problems are sometimes posed in a binary, 
yes-no fashion—e.g., is the design of an automobile reasonable? But 
such apparent binariness does not render the underlying problem 
unicentric if reaching a yes-no decision requires one to evaluate the 
interconnected elements of the design more-or-less de novo. In any 
event, polycentricity is a matter of degree, varying with the number 
of relevant elements and their interconnectedness.12
 Solving a problem must be distinguished from choosing one’s ob-
jectives or justifying one’s choices.13 Problem solving assumes that 
objectives have been identified and involves searching for and finding 
a strategy by which to overcome obstacles that threaten to prevent 
attainment of those objectives. Discovering such a strategy solves, 
and thus eliminates, the problem. Although a solution may exist even 
if it is not implemented,14 when an attempt at implementation re-
veals that the proposed strategy will not succeed but that another 
strategy may be possible, the problem, having earlier been solved and 
thereby eliminated, is revived. 
 One must also distinguish solutions to problems from resolutions 
of conflicts. A conflict arises when two or more actors assert incom-
patible claims to the same resource. Each party’s claim in a conflict 
situation presents an obstacle to the achievement of the other party’s 
objectives and thus presents each side with the problem of designing 
a strategy, or game plan, by which to maximize that side’s chances of 
prevailing over the other. Thus, when adversaries engage in zero-
sum bargaining, or when they litigate, or when they go to war, re-
solving the underlying conflict, as such, does not constitute solving a 
problem. In the course of the contest, each of the adversaries must 
solve their own strategic and tactical problems unilaterally as they 
arise, and initial game plans invariably must be revised or aban-
doned as events unfold.15 But the end result—the resolution of the 
                                                                                                                  
quantitative axis. Framing equitable relief tends to be different from assessing money 
damages. For example, ordering that a complex business operation be reconfigured to  
reduce air pollution presents a polycentric problem of design. Cf. supra note 9 and  
accompanying text. 
 12. See Fuller, supra note 9, at 397.  
 13. The formulation and expression of personal preferences are forms of decisionmak-
ing that do not, in themselves, involve problem solving. Instead, they constitute assertions 
of personal sovereignty. See generally Sarah Lichtenstein & Paul Slovic, The Construction 
of Preference: An Overview, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF PREFERENCE 1, 1-2 (Sarah Lichten-
stein & Paul Slovic eds., 2006). 
 14. One prominent planning theorist has asserted, erroneously by this account, that a 
solution exists only if it has been adopted and followed. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY
passim (2011). For a useful development of the planning theory see generally Bridgeman,); 
supra note 2. 
 15. A nineteenth century Prussian military officer observed that “[n]o plan of opera-
tion extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy’s main strength.” 
MOLTKE ON THE ART OF WAR: SELECTED WRITINGS 45 (Daniel J. Hughes ed., Daniel J. 
Hughes & Harry Bell trans., 1993). 
226 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:221
conflict between the parties—is not, itself, a solution but rather the 
implementation of the prevailing party’s solution.16
 Implementation of a solution consists of efforts, using the solution 
as a guide, to remove the obstacle giving rise to the problem. Even 
when successful, such efforts often create new problems requiring 
new solutions.17 And implementation of those solutions may create 
additional problems, and so on. Thus, implementation of a solution 
frequently involves an ongoing decision process rather than a singu-
lar event. Moreover, when a solution calls for cooperative assistance 
from others, or when a solution must be validated by an official au-
thority such as a court or legislature, then implementation involves 
two stages, often separated in time: first, the implementers must ob-
tain the necessary assistance or validation; and second, the resources 
required to eliminate the obstacle(s) must actually be expended.18
 B.   The Problem-Solving Processes Most Relevant to This Analysis 
 The discussions that follow focus mainly on decision processes 
employed by individuals and by courts. The author has recently con-
sidered a more inclusive spectrum of problem-solving processes,19 but 
a limited exposition will serve this Article’s purposes. Individual and 
small-group problem solving is important because courts largely del-
egate to private decisionmakers; judicial problem solving is im-
portant because courts are the primary implementers of solutions 
reached by such private orderers. As will be explained, individuals 
solve polycentric problems by exercising experience-based discretion. 
Single individuals and very small groups are paradigmatic solvers of 
such problems. By contrast, judges and juries, the primary creators 
and appliers of tort law, function under institutional constraints that 
significantly limit discretionary decisionmaking. Thus, to understand 
how tort law relies on both private actors and courts to develop and 
implement solutions, it will be necessary to consider the methodolo-
gies upon which both categories of problem solvers rely. 
                                                                                                                  
 16. Of the examples offered in the text, the most directly relevant to this analysis is 
litigation. As subsequent discussions will reveal, each party engages in problem solving by 
preparing for trial (or later, appeal) and by participating in solving procedural and eviden-
tiary problems during trial. The trial court solves procedural and evidentiary problems, 
exercising discretion in doing so. See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common 
Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 843-45 (2008). But the court decides the case substantively by 
choosing one side’s proposed solution on the merits—that is, by resolving the conflicts  
between the parties. 
 17. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe observed that the solution of every problem is an-
other problem. See SIDNEY H. MORSE & JOSEPH B. MARVIN, 8 THE RADICAL 111, 183, 259,
403 (1871). 
 18. Implementations of solutions to large-scale social problems often require large-
scale resources, which explains why problem solvers seek validation and sponsorship from 
large organizations and institutions. 
 19. See generally Henderson, supra note 2. 
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1.   How Individuals and Small Groups Solve Complex Problems 
Through the Exercise of Experience-Based Discretion 
 Individuals solve most minor problems so automatically that they 
hardly notice, relying on combinations of mental shortcuts and rules 
of thumb.20 Regarding more deliberative problem solving, the human 
mind is capable of dealing with complex situations, employing tech-
niques that researchers have explored for decades. One of the most 
highly regarded researchers of the twentieth century was Herbert 
Simon, best known for his work on the role of mental shortcuts, or 
heuristics. Simon coined the phrase “bounded rationality” to refer to 
processes by which individual problem solvers search their memories 
for preexisting solutions and then choose which solution to imple-
ment from among the available alternatives.21 Lon Fuller, upon 
whose work with the forms and limits of adjudication subsequent dis-
cussions rely, used the term “managerial direction” to refer to this 
decisionmaking process.22 Herbert Simon teamed with Allen Newell 
in the early 1970s to produce the first ambitious study of individual 
problem solving.23 Building on the insight that the human brain pro-
cesses information in basically the same way as a computer, the au-
thors describe back-and-forth movements between the elements of 
the problem and possible solutions drawn from experience.24 In their 
view, the key to success lies in the problem solver being able to deal 
simultaneously with the constituent elements of a polycentric prob-
lem and the problem as an interconnected whole.25
 Donald Schön, a philosopher concerned with deliberative problem 
solving, provides further insights.26 According to Schön, when at-
tempting to solve a complex, polycentric problem, an expert intuitive-
ly relies on rules of thumb developed through experience and search-
es for analogies to previously derived solutions.27 The author’s case 
studies demonstrate how experienced problem solvers make the 
transition from a problem involving many interconnected elements to 
an integrated solution-of-a-whole. The author speaks of the problem 
solver’s back-and-forth consideration of the individual constitutive 
elements and the problem in its entirety as a reflective “conversation” 
                                                                                                                  
 20. See 3 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: EMPIRICALLY 
GROUNDED ECONOMIC REASON 291-94 (1997). 
 21. See id.
 22. See Fuller, supra note 9, at 398 (In the exercise of managerial direction “a good 
deal of ‘intuition’ is indispensable.”). 
 23. See NEWELL & SIMON, supra note 6 passim.
 24. Id. at 87-140. See generally Earl Hunt, Problem Solving, in THINKING AND PROB-
LEM SOLVING 215, 217-22 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 2d ed. 1994). 
 25. See Hunt, supra note 24, at 227; see also Fuller, supra note 9, at 403. 
 26. See DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS 
THINK IN ACTION (1983). 
 27. See generally infra notes 49-50. 
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between the problem solver and the problem.28 Referring to an archi-
tecture professor reviewing a student’s proposed design of a school 
complex and suggesting changes, Schön observes: 
The web of [possible] moves has many branchings, which 
complicates the problem . . . . As he reflects . . . on the situa-
tion created by his earlier moves, the designer must consider 
not only the present choice but the tree of further choices to 
which it leads . . . .  
. . . . 
He also demonstrates how the whole is at stake in every par-
tial move. Once a whole idea has been created, a bad place-
ment of the [school] administration can ruin it. Hence the de-
signer must oscillate between the unit and the [whole] . . . .29
A small group of architects might collaborate to perform the same 
problem-solving task that the individual architect solved in  
Schön’s example.30
2.   Zero-Sum Bargaining and Collaborative Negotiation as  
Problem-Solving Processes 
 Zero-sum bargaining, by means of which contracting parties work 
out the basic terms of a deal, is a form of conflict resolution that an 
earlier discussion distinguished from problem solving.31 In most in-
stances, the parties have solved their own problems unilaterally, em-
ploying the individual or small-group techniques described in the 
preceding section, and then bargain their way to agreement regard-
ing the terms over which they are in conflict. Once the contracting 
parties agree on these remaining terms, or perhaps while bargaining 
over them, they may collaborate to solve mutual problems embedded 
in the emerging deal.32 As with collaborative problem solving outside 
of the framework of deal making, the success of collaborative contract 
                                                                                                                  
 28. Id. at 93-95. 
 29. Id. at 99-102. 
 30. With regard to the size of problem-solving groups, the author of this Article  
recently observed in Henderson, supra note 2, at 108-09:  
Experience reveals that only if the group is quite small—two or three is ideal—can 
the members collaboratively engage in the back-and-forth process between the 
problem and possible solutions that . . . Schön describe[s]. Such a work environ-
ment minimizes ego-driven, zero-sum competition, allowing the collaborators to 
travel through the problem space together, building on each other’s contributions. 
 31. Zero-sum bargaining occurs when a gain to one side generates a corresponding 
loss to the other. It may be distinguished from collaborative bargaining, from which joint 
gains are possible. See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 110-11. Regarding conflict 
resolution, see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
 32. See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 110-11; infra notes 105-11 and  
accompanying text. 
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negotiation depends on shared purposes, willingness to cooperate, 
and workable group size.33 Since the paradigm of deal making in-
volves one party-in-interest on two sides of a deal, group size is usu-
ally not problematic.34 Collaborative problem solving is most likely to 
occur when the negotiating parties seek an arrangement whereby 
they will cooperate in the future in an ongoing enterprise.35
3.   Adjudication as a Problem-Solving Process 
 Regarding the capacity of courts to solve complex social problems 
by making and applying law, the individuals who serve as judges 
should be as capable as was the architect in Schön’s case study.36 Af-
ter all, judges—especially federal judges—tend to be mature, intelli-
gent, well-educated people who perform their judicial tasks either 
individually (trial judges) or in small groups (appellate panels).37 To 
be sure, courts may not seek out social problems to solve; they must 
wait for the parties to bring proposed solutions to them for approval 
and implementation.38 But for substantive issues that reach them 
and require problem solving—primarily making new law in compara-
tively dramatic fashion—courts would seem to combine the appropri-
ate decision structures with the appropriate personnel to make them 
effective problem solvers. This picture of judicial competence changes 
when attention turns to the traditional constraints on courts’ official 
problem-solving capabilities. Whatever inherent capacities judges as 
individuals may possess, as institutional decisionmakers their poten-
tial for solving complex social problems is constrained in ways  
that render courts only marginally effective as social problem solv-
ers.39 Thus, reflecting concern for the fact that judges and juries are 
not politically accountable, a cluster of justiciability doctrines limit 
                                                                                                                  
 33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 34. When a larger number of parties-in-interest are involved, negotiations can be 
difficult. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 7 (2d ed. 1991) (“When there are many parties, . . . bargaining 
is even worse.”). 
 35. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 676-80 (1976). 
 36. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 37. Supreme courts are on the borderline of manageability, but their members are 
repeat players who develop a shared sense of collegiality that allows for collaborative deci-
sionmaking. See generally FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making 
on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1998). When federal courts of appeals sit en 
banc, the large numbers of decisionmakers can present special difficulties, see Arthur D. 
Hellman, Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 425 (2000); Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too 
Large? A Statistical Study of Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711, 712 (2000). 
 38. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 
U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 935-37 (2006).  
 39. Regarding the underlying social issues, courts resolve conflicts rather than solve 
problems. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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courts to addressing sharply framed cases and unicentric controver-
sies brought to them for decision.40 And in reaching decisions, the 
traditional view is that courts should, to the extent possible, avoid 
trying to solve broad social problems by creating law.41
 Who, if not courts on a case-by-case basis, provide public solutions 
to the social coordination problems that give rise to litigated tort 
claims? Lawmakers, including courts employing the gradual, accre-
tive common law process, formulate generally applicable public solu-
tions by creating the tort law that courts apply to reach outcomes in 
litigated cases. And then tort litigants take the initiative in solving 
the problems presented in particular cases by shaping their claims 
and preparing game plans for how best to engage their opponents at 
trial. In this view, the central task of the trial court, besides exercis-
ing discretion in solving fact-sensitive procedural and evidentiary 
problems as they arise, is to resolve the conflicts between the parties 
relating to which side’s proposed solution to the social problem un-
derlying the claim deserves to be officially implemented.42 In per-
forming this implementative function, courts help to solve broader 
social problems by marginally adjusting existing law when new fact 
patterns arise. But in most instances, they perform this law-making 
function only incrementally as part of an ongoing common-law pro-
cess rather than by a single trial judge or appellate panel acting in 
sweeping, decisive fashion.43
 Lon Fuller approaches the limits of courts’ problem-solving capa-
bilities from a somewhat different direction, but he ends up in the 
same place.44 Instead of focusing on the extrinsic, top-down norma-
tive constraints traditionally imposed on judicial problem solving, 
Fuller invokes what may be characterized as an intrinsic, bottom-up 
perspective.45 To provide litigants the opportunity to argue that they 
are entitled to favorable outcomes as a matter of right, Fuller reasons 
that law must consist of rules and standards that are sufficiently 
specific to separate the elements of complex, polycentric problems 
                                                                                                                  
 40. Article III states that the judicial power of the federal courts extends only to cases 
and controversies that arise under the Constitution, federal laws of the United States, and its 
treaties. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability,
86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 76-77 (2007). 
 41. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROB-
LEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 342 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994) (“[T]he development of a body of decisional law is only a byproduct of 
the judicial process.”). 
 42. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 43. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Fuller, supra note 9. 
 45. It will be observed that Fuller's most famous essay on the subject, see supra note 8, 
refers to “the limits of adjudication” rather than limits on adjudication, clearly envisioning 
intrinsic, organic limits. Examples of extrinsic, normative limits include political con-
straints based on political unaccountability. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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and to arrange these elements in linear sequences that allow the liti-
gants to take the tribunal through a logical chain of reasoning to the 
right result.46 Tort law performs this function by disaggregating as-
pects of the underlying social problems into constituent elements, 
each of which may be determined in a sequence along an essentially 
linear, more-versus-less, axis.47 In connection with the intentional 
tort of battery, for example, to establish a prima facie claim, a plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant acted, intending a harmful or of-
fensive contact with the person of another, and that a harmful or of-
fensive contact with the plaintiff’s person resulted.48 In effect, tort 
doctrine solves large, complex coordination problems ahead of time, 
leaving courts with the more manageable task of applying relatively 
specific rules to found facts to reach particular outcomes. Regarding 
less formal areas of tort such as negligence, the analysis of tort law in 
Part III, infra, explains how courts manage (sometimes only barely) 
to stay within their bounds.49
 Under Fuller’s analysis, if the applicable substantive law lacks the 
specificity necessary to reduce the polycentricity of the social problem 
underlying a tort claim—if the only guide to decision is reasonable-
ness under the circumstances—litigants face difficulties in trying to 
progress through linear chains of logic that lead to the proper out-
come. Instead, excessive vagueness in the relevant legal norms forces 
the litigants and the tribunal to address the complex underlying so-
cial problem “of a whole,” as did the architect designing a school com-
plex in Schön’s example.50 Superficially, it might appear that the cir-
cumstances confronting the court are different from those confronting 
the architect. After all, Schön’s task facing the architect was to create 
a design more-or-less from scratch. By contrast, the court’s task is to 
decide, ostensibly on a binary, yes/no basis, whether or not the de-
fendant behaved unreasonably under all the circumstances. But 
these tasks are much more similar than might at first appear. To de-
termine the unreasonableness of the defendant’s conduct in a tort 
case, a tribunal is required to review the interconnected circumstanc-
es surrounding that conduct much as it might if it were, as was  
the architect, designing a course of action in the first instance. The 
fact that the outcome is expressed in a yes/no format does not greatly  
                                                                                                                  
 46. Id. at 394-404. 
 47. See pp. 4-5 supra., n.9. 
 48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965). 
 49. In prior normative analyses, this author has criticized aspects of negligence doc-
trine for providing courts with inadequate guides to decision. See, e.g., James A. Hender-
son, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat From the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 
(1976) [hereinafter Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept]; James A. Henderson, 
Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication,
73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973). 
 50. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
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reduce the complexity of the court’s task in reaching its decision.51 Of 
course, given that polycentricity is a matter of degree, the binariness 
of a yes/no decision may reduce the tribunal’s difficulties somewhat.52
But any such reduction under a reasonableness standard faithfully 
applied would be marginal; it would not by itself render the tribunal’s  
task adjudicable. 
 To the extent that a vague standard of unreasonableness does not 
provide an adequate basis on which the parties can join issue in ar-
guing for a favorable outcome as a matter of right, the litigants on 
both sides necessarily are reduced to entreating the tribunal to em-
pathize with them and to exercise broad discretion in their favor.53
Such a circumstance denies the parties their traditional opportuni-
ties to participate meaningfully as advocates who seek the court’s 
assistance not primarily as a social problem solver, but as an imple-
menter of the parties’ own proposed solutions. The architect in 
Schön’s example was under no similar obligation to give anyone the 
equivalent of a day in court; he was free, as courts traditionally are 
not, to exercise broad discretion, basing his solution on instinct and 
intuition informed by experience. 
 How is it that courts are capable of making law? Once relatively 
specific standards have been developed and are in place, polycentrici-
ty is presumably minimized when applying those standards. But how 
do courts avoid solving polycentric problems in designing those com-
mon law standards to begin with? One part of the answer is that 
courts do not develop common law “of a whole,” as did Schön’s archi-
tect with regard to the school complex.54 Rather, courts create and 
expand common law doctrine implicitly, gradually, and marginally by 
applying established rules and standards to new fact patterns that 
differ from earlier patterns only incrementally.55 But what of the be-
ginnings of the common law? Were not courts required to solve poly-
centric problems in order to get tort law started? 
                                                                                                                  
 51. See supra text following note 11. 
 52. The judicial decisionmaker(s) under a yes-no approach might feel more at liberty 
to employ a heuristic—in this context a “cheat”—inviting reliance on an intuitional hunch 
that largely ignores the intricacies of the plaintiff’s arguments and frees the decisionmaker 
to substitute its own single-factor test. Cf. infra note 117 and accompanying text (describ-
ing how, by contrast to the yes-no approach, the untaken-precaution approach in negli-
gence cases actually does reduce the polycentricity of the issues for decision). 
 53. This same situation would arise if a court were to consider the adoption of a radi-
cally new substantive rule and invite the parties to present policy arguments for and 
against the rule, including suggested modifications. Sponsors of legislation can threaten to 
withhold political support in order to persuade legislators to vote favorably. But litigants 
can make no similar threats. When courts are free to exercise broad discretion, litigants 
are in the position of politicians entreating their constituents to vote for them. Courts avoid 
placing litigants in such positions by making new law only marginally and incrementally. 
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text; infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 54. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 55. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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 Not nearly to the extent that might first appear. The common law 
of torts began with formal writs of trespass, invoking boundary-
crossing concepts that avoided reliance on fault and that continue, to 
this day, to minimize polycentricity in connection with intentional 
torts and strict liability.56 Negligence, which courts developed into 
approximately its current form in the nineteenth century, did not 
begin with the potentially polycentric problem of assessing defend-
ants’ failures to take reasonable care but with the more unicentric 
and hence adjudicable problem of assessing whether or not the plain-
tiff’s harm flowed indirectly (rather than directly) from trespasses to 
the persons and property of others.57 Influential scholars helped to 
conceptualize and articulate emerging tort concepts at critical junc-
tures.58 However, at no point in the development of the common law 
did single judicial decisions create complex tort doctrine from scratch, 
as did the architect in Schön’s earlier example.59 Even notable doctri-
nal “leaps” almost always reveal themselves, on closer inspection, to 
have been premised on precedential lines of incremental doctrinal 
growth.60 Thus, it is no exaggeration to observe that the historical 
development of Anglo-American tort law rests as much, if not more, 
on the necessity of avoiding relatively unadjudicable, polycentric 
problems as on the promotion of substantive policy objectives. The 
question of which came first, procedure (courts) or substance (law), 
has intrigued legal scholars for quite some time.61
III.   HOW TORT REGULATIONS ARE FRAMED, OFTEN DELEGATING TO 
PRIVATE MANAGERS, TO AVOID UNADJUDICABLE PROBLEMS
 This Part uses the preceding accounts of problem solving and the 
limits of adjudication to explain tort law’s regulative dimensions—the 
remarkable extent to which tort rules generally are framed suffi-
ciently formally to allow courts to avoid heavy reliance on the exer-
cise of discretion in reaching outcomes. Although tort regulations 
presumably aim at achieving coherent substantive objectives, this 
                                                                                                                  
 56. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a  
General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 450-55 (1990); see also infra
Part III.A. 
 57. See generally Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort 
Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225, 225-26 (1971). 
 58. The most important of these was Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652 (1873). For a description of Holmes’ crea-
tive role in helping to conceptualize the emerging law in the nineteenth century see 
Vandevelde, supra note 56, at 458-62. 
 59. Even the architect used his past experiences in drawing analogies to the current 
problem. See SCHÖN, supra note 26, at 49. 
 60. A classic example is found in Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), given credit for abolishing the requirement of privity of contract 
in products liability litigation. 
 61. See Fuller, supra note 9, at 372 (“Which comes first, courts or rules?”). 
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Part explains how one can adequately understand tort law only by 
appreciating how substance plays off of form and process.62 Whatever 
overall objectives tort law may pursue, whether tort promotes effi-
ciency or corrective justice, this analysis explains the forms and pro-
cesses employed in that pursuit. Thus, Part III is concerned primari-
ly with form rather than with substance—with how the regulative 
rules of tort reduce the polycentricity of social coordination problems 
sufficiently to allow litigants to have meaningful days in court.63
A.  How Intentional Torts Avoid Presenting Open-Ended Problems 
Requiring Discretionary Judgment 
 Previous discussions reveal that the most telling challenges to  
adjudicability occur when tort regulations purport to require courts 
to assess the unreasonableness, under all relevant circumstances, of 
harm-causing conduct.64 In such contexts, most prevalent in negli-
gence, the “relevant circumstances” tend to be interconnected and the 
judicial task of law-application, often involving cost-benefit analysis, 
tends to require the exercise of discretion. By contrast, intentional 
torts avoid such open-ended, polycentric issues mainly by focusing on 
intended, unconsented-to boundary crossings as the primary liability 
triggers and then adopting a relentless, “chips fall where they may” 
approach to determining the scope of a boundary-crossing actor’s le-
gal liability.65 As long as the relevant boundaries are defined formally 
to minimize the need for discretionary assessments of unreasonable-
ness; and the pivotal concepts of intent and consent do not incorpo-
rate notions of unreasonableness as the primary guides to decision; 
intentional torts do not present unadjudicable claims.66
                                                                                                                  
 62. See also 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (2001); cf. supra note 61 and ac-
companying text. See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 2 (8th 
ed. 2012) (“[T]his book is dedicated to the proposition that the substantive law can be un-
derstood only in relation to the processes by which it is applied.”).
 63. As earlier discussions make clear, a “day in court” is meaningful only to the extent 
that the litigant has the opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking by making re-
spectful demands on courts to reach legally required outcomes. See supra notes 39-54 and  
accompanying text. 
 64. See supra text following note 49. 
 65. Intentional trespassers are strictly liable for the harm they cause to the persons or 
properties upon whom, or which, they intrude. See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET 
AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 411, 412 (8th ed. 2012). And proximate causation is easier for 
plaintiffs to establish in connection with battery claims than it is in connection with negli-
gence claims. In battery, the defendant is liable for all the harm that directly or indirectly 
results from the wrongful contact. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). 
 66. Regarding trespass to the person (battery), the requisite element is contact  
with the plaintiff’s person, which is defined unicentrically. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 18 cmt. c (1965). The same thing is true regarding trespass to land, see HENDER-
SON ET AL., supra note 62, at 411-13, and intent and consent are defined so as to minimize 
polycentricity, see infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. 
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 A key to success in this regard lies in defining intent in terms of 
subjective mental states that do not depend primarily on open-ended 
assessments of unreasonableness. Thus, an actor intends a conse-
quence of his act—e.g., in a battery, harmful or offensive contact with 
the person of another—when the actor either subjectively desires 
that the consequence occur or actually knows that it is substantially 
certain to follow.67 The greatest threat to adjudicability would occur if 
courts were to allow triers of fact to infer intent from the unreasona-
bleness or recklessness of the act and the relative probability that 
injurious consequence would follow. If that were to occur, it would be 
a short step to transform essentially unicentric inquiries regarding 
actors’ subjective states of mind and their direct consequences into 
many-centered inquiries regarding the costs and benefits of defend-
ants’ actions under all the circumstances.68 The second prong of the 
definition of intent—the “knowledge with substantial certainty” 
prong69—helps to prevent the transmutation of focused contests 
over subjective desire into open-ended contests over what reasona-
ble persons would have desired under similar circumstances. 
Knowledge-with-certainty plays out on a linear axis. Such knowledge 
is not simply circumstantial evidence that, along with other inter-
connected elements, supports an inference of desire-based intent; it 
constitutes intent, in and of itself.70
 Moreover, by requiring that the defendant intend the consequenc-
es of an act rather than merely the act itself,71 tort doctrine avoids 
treating as intentional torts a wide range of deliberate conduct that 
causes harm only inadvertently.72 In this manner, tort doctrine makes 
                                                                                                                  
 67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (2010). 
 68. Had American courts not broken off intentional torts from fault-based torts in the 
nineteenth century, this might have been an eventual consequence. See generally
Vandevelde, supra note 56, at 452. It will be remembered that, in the immediate aftermath 
of the break-off, the fault-based branch of tort did not call for a polycentric weighing of 
social costs and benefits, See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 1(b) (2010); see supra text accompanying note 67. 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1(b) 
(2010). Of course, the plaintiff is free to ask the trier of fact to infer the actor’s desire to 
cause a consequence from the high risk that an adverse consequence will follow. But even 
when the trier of fact concludes that the defendant did not desire the consequence, the 
“substantial certainty” branch remains as a possible independent basis for supporting a 
finding of intent. See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955). 
 71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 
(2010); see supra text accompanying note 67. 
 72. American law builds into the definition of “act” the element of volition, thereby 
leaving to the concept of intent the sole responsibility for dealing with the consequences of 
acts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (1965) (An act is “an external manifestation 
of the actor’s will and does not include any of its results, even the most direct, immediate, 
and intended.”) Thus, an act may result in a negative consequence, but unless that consequence 
is intended, no liability for intentional tort follows. Before trespass-on-the-case (fault) broke 
off from trespass in the nineteenth century, the bedrock concept was that of a volitional 
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clear that an actor commits an intentional tort only when the actor 
intends certain specifically defined, antisocial consequences, thereby 
resisting the temptation to ask courts to solve polycentric problems 
involving the social costs and benefits of actors’ deliberate, but unin-
tentionally harm-causing, conduct. 
 Tort law’s treatment of consent, a centrally important element in 
both defining defendants’ wrongdoing and providing affirmative de-
fenses,73 parallels its treatment of intent. Thus, consent consists not 
only in the victim’s subjective willingness for a consequence to occur 
but also in the objective manifestation of such willingness irrespec-
tive of the victim’s subjective state of mind.74 Again, as with intent, if 
consent were simply subjective willingness in fact, then in a range of 
circumstances in which victims objectively manifest willingness ex 
ante but insist ex post they were not subjectively willing, courts 
would be tempted to engage in evaluations of the surrounding cir-
cumstances including the reasonableness of both parties’ interac-
tions.75 By all but eliminating the relevance of such potentially poly-
centric inquiries, the rule that equates manifestation-of-willingness 
with binding consent helps courts to maintain the adjudicability of 
intentional tort claims in which consent is an issue. 
 In at least two important contexts, intentional tort doctrine relies 
on ostensibly open-textured reasonableness standards. To invoke a 
privilege of self-defense, an actor’s belief that defensive action is nec-
essary must be reasonable;76 and to constitute an offensive battery, 
an unconsented-to contact with another’s person must be such as to 
offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity.77 Although, in both in-
stances, tort doctrine appears to rely on the same concept of reasona-
bleness that threatens courts with difficulties in connection with neg-
ligence claims;78 the intentional tort contexts are importantly differ-
ent. As will be explained, reliance on the reasonableness standard in 
the negligence context pressures courts to exercise discretion in ad-
dressing the polycentric question of whether harm-causing conduct, 
                                                                                                                  
act; the shift of focus to the consequences of acts accompanied the emergence and develop-
ment of the fault-based tort. See generally Vandevelde, supra note 56, at 451-52. 
 73. Part of the definition of an offensive contact is the lack of consent by the victim. 
See DOBBS, supra note 62, at 54-56. And consent also serves as an affirmative defense to 
intentional torts. See id. at 216-17. 
 74. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 28 N.E. 266, 266 (Mass. 1891). 
 75. In the O’Brien case, the plaintiff claimed that the steamship company’s doctor had 
vaccinated her against her will even though she admitted that she had not objected when 
the vaccination occurred. Id. at 273. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts concluded as a 
matter of law that the defendant company had a right to presume consent under the cir-
cumstances. Id. at 274-75. A full-blown inquiry into the reasonableness of the parties’ behav-
iors, avoided by the apparent-consent rule, would have presented a polycentric problem. 
 76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63, 65 (1965). 
 77. Id. § 19. 
 78. The concepts are similar in that in all of these contexts such “mixed questions of 
law and fact” are mostly for juries to decide. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 85.  
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in light of an interconnected web of various social costs and benefits, 
should have been engaged in less riskily.79 By contrast, the self-
defense privilege exerts no similar pressure toward polycentric prob-
lem solving. Instead, the issue is whether, on essentially more-
versus-less, linear axes, the defendant actor believed that the defen-
sive use of force was necessary and that this belief was adequately 
rooted in reasonable appearances and common sense.80 And the of-
fensiveness of an unconsented-to personal contact in the battery con-
text is determined on an essentially linear scale of social unaccepta-
bility that does not require the court to exercise significant discretion 
in reaching a conclusion.81
B.  How Negligence Tests, But Does Not Quite Exceed, the  
Limits of Adjudication 
The source of difficulty with the negligence doctrine has already 
been identified. Judging harm-causing conduct against a vague 
standard of unreasonableness82 in most circumstances would require 
a court to exercise discretion in solving a polycentric problem involv-
ing a number of interdependent variables.83 As will be explained, in 
actuality, courts in negligence cases routinely implement a number of 
doctrinal adjustments designed to reduce the interconnectedness of 
the issues presented. But the fact remains that, unlike intentional 
torts that invoke reasonableness only collaterally and unicentrical-
ly,84 negligence doctrine rests fundamentally on a polycentric version 
of that vague concept. As the following discussion makes clear, in 
seeking to reduce polycentricity to manageable levels, courts rely on 
two coping mechanisms. First, tort law adjusts duties of care and lim-
its elements of recovery ex ante, before the fact of accidental injury. 
In these contexts, tort doctrine either replaces the vague reasonable-
ness standard with more specific liability rules or eliminates liability 
altogether. And second, in contexts where specific doctrinal rules  
are unavailable and the duty of care remains vague, negligence  
doctrine adjusts ex post by requiring plaintiff-victims to demonstrate 
specifically how the defendants breached their general duties and 
how those breaches caused the plaintiffs’ harms. 
                                                                                                                  
 79. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 
159-61 (“[C]ourts do not expect the defendant to make a ‘microscopic analysis’ of the situa-
tion, only to act reasonably considering the emergency.”). 
 81. The court need not judge offensiveness based on a web of interconnected, possibly 
countervailing elements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a (1965) (To be 
offensive, contact “must . . . be a contact which is unwarranted by the social usages preva-
lent at the time and place at which it is inflicted.”). 
 82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010). 
 83. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. 
 84. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
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1.   Specifying the Duty of Care Ex Ante of Accidental Injury 
 Examples of ex ante specifications of duties of care abound. Thus, 
courts incorporate the specific customary standards of professional 
defendants such as physicians and lawyers, judging their conduct by 
what other professionals actually do in similar circumstances.85 And 
courts defer to specific standards established in relevant safety stat-
utes and regulations.86 Moreover, courts often adjust the general neg-
ligence standard without reference to exogenous sources, sometimes 
raising the relevant duties and sometimes lowering them. Thus, in 
this latter connection, common carriers owe their passengers a 
heightened duty that in some jurisdictions approaches an obligation 
to prevent injury regardless of the relevant costs,87 and possessors of 
land owe lessened duties to some categories of entrants, most notably 
trespassers, to the point of owing no duties of care at all.88 In each 
instance, these adjustments in the duty of reasonable care signifi-
cantly reduce the polycentricity of the issues presented, thereby sub-
stantially reducing the need for the exercise of judicial discretion.89 In 
connection with duties owed to entrants on land, some observers and 
courts have argued normatively in favor of an expanded duty of rea-
sonable care owed to all entrants, including trespassers.90 Although 
the case law has moved marginally in response to these entreaties, 
more extreme adjustments have rarely held sway.91
                                                                                                                  
 85. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 13 cmt. b (2010); DOBBS, supra note 62, at 632-34. 
 86. Unexcused violations of safety statutes and regulations are generally treated as 
negligence per se. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 14, 15; DOBBS, supra note 62, at 315-16. 
 87. See, e.g., Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70, 76 (Colo. 
1998). See generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 383-84. At some point, of course, such a rule 
translates into one of strict liability, under which actors set their own standards and simply 
pay victims for the harms the actors cause. See infra note 89. 
 88. See, e.g., Wagner v. Doehring, 553 A.2d 684, 686 (Md. 1989) (noting that posses-
sors owe trespassers only a duty to refrain from wanton and willful conduct). 
 89. To the extent to which the rules raising and lowering the duties of care based on 
the parties’ status approach the functional equivalents of strict liabilities and strict im-
munities, they become single-factor tests that are not polycentric; both strict liability, see 
infra note 124 and accompanying text, and strict immunity, see infra note 109 and accom-
panying text, avoid the necessity of courts determining reasonableness. 
 90. See, e.g., Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business Premises—One 
Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820, 821-23 (1975); Comment, 
Torts—Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to All Entrants—“Invitee,” 
“Licensee,” and “Trespasser” Distinctions Abolished, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 426, 426, 431 (1969). 
The leading case adopting the broader duty is Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 
1968). See generally HENDERSON ET AL, supra note 62, at 230-42; Henderson, Expanding 
the Negligence Concept, supra note 49, at 479-82 (discussing critically judicial broadening  
of duty).
 91. See, e.g., Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 446 (W. Va. 1999) (abolishing the licen-
see/invitee distinction while retaining the trespasser category). See generally James A. Hender-
son, Jr., The Status of Trespassers on Land, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1071, 1071-73 (2009). 
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 Analogous to the all-but-nonexistent duties of care owed by land 
possessors to trespassers, American courts refuse to recognize a gen-
eral duty to rescue strangers, thereby avoiding a host of polycentric 
problems.92 Courts recognize important exceptions that render the 
operative liability rules manageably specific.93 Once again, tort schol-
ars who overlook the limits of process and focus exclusively on sub-
stance have argued in favor of a general reasonableness-based duty 
to rescue strangers.94 But strong process arguments support the tra-
ditional rule, which appears to retain its validity.95 A functionally 
similar approach to maintaining adjudicability involves limits on 
negligence-based recovery for emotional upset and economic loss. 
From the perspective of this Article, if courts were to impose no lim-
its on recovery or were to abolish recovery entirely for these elements 
of harm, polycentric problems requiring the exercise of broad judicial 
discretion would be avoided.96 But when substantive considerations 
dictate that courts steer a middle course,97 determining on a case-by-
case basis who may recover under vague reasonableness standards, 
difficulties arise. Thus, American courts reject a broad right to recov-
er on the part of bystanders who suffer emotional upset upon observ-
ing or learning of a negligently caused accident.98 Tort plaintiffs who 
suffer upset resulting from their own physical injuries or whose upset 
is caused intentionally do not present serious adjudicability problems 
and may recover.99 But as a general rule, onlooker or bystander 
plaintiffs may not.  
                                                                                                                  
 92. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 37 (2010) (Preliminary Draft No. 4, Sept. 5, 2003); HENDERSON ET AL., supra
note 62, at 244-72; DOBBS, supra note 62, at 853-56. For an explanation of why a general 
duty to rescue would present polycentric problems see James A. Henderson, Jr., Process  
Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 938-40 (1982) [hereinafter Henderson,  
Process Constraints].
 93. DOBBS, supra note 62, at 856-64. 
 94. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evaluation and In-
centive Structure of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879, 881 (1986); Ernest J. 
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 247-48 (1980). 
 95. See, e.g., Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 92. 
 96. Without reasonableness-based limits—no limits at all, or total bars—calculating 
recoveries would be done on unicentric, linear axes. See supra note 11 and accompanying 
text; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text. Substantively, these approaches would 
presumably produce too much liability (no-limit rule) or too little (no-recovery rule). But 
either approach would be adjudicable.  
 97. Both emotional upset and economic loss have their own sets of supporting sub-
stantive considerations, including difficulties of proof. But the one they share in common is 
concern over potentially crushing liability. 
 98. See, e.g., Jorgenson v. B.F. Yenney Constr. Co., 255 A.D.2d 1008 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1998). See generally HENDERSON ET. AL., supra note 62, at 316-33. (stating that courts have 
rejected a general rule, adopting “a variety of liability-limiting approaches,” instead). 
 99. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 316 (“Recovery for mental and emotional 
upset resulting from tortiously caused physical injury is not controversial.”) Regarding the 
right to recover for intentionally caused mental and emotional upset see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.  
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 How have American courts managed to steer a middle course re-
garding bystander recovery for mental upset under negligence law? 
Beginning with a no-duty rule barring judicial inquiry, the earliest 
extension of liability allowed recovery by plaintiffs who were physi-
cally impacted, even if not physically injured, by the defendant’s con-
duct.100 Subsequently, plaintiffs in the zone of danger could recover 
for their upset.101 Further expansion, though measured and cautious, 
has followed. Today, a majority of American courts allow bystanders 
outside the zone of danger to recover for mental upset only when it is 
suffered by a primary victim’s close family members who contempo-
raneously witness the upsetting event.102 These formal elements, 
although they achieve adjudicative manageability, have been contro-
versial.103 In any event, the point here is that none of these approach-
es requires, to a significant degree, the exercise of judicial discretion  
to implement. 
 The second type of negligence-caused harm for which courts have 
developed limits on recovery is pure economic loss, for which courts 
will not generally allow recovery in tort.104 As with mental upset, the 
reasons for imposing limits in the first instance are substantive; 
without any such limits, courts could presumably adjudicate awards 
for such losses without difficulty.105 But to try to limit economic 
loss awards based on case-by-case determinations regarding the 
appropriateness of recovery would exceed the limits of adjudication.106
Thus, by confining fault-based recovery to instances where the plain-
tiff’s economic losses flow parasitically from tortiously caused harm 
                                                                                                                  
 100. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (N.Y. 1896) (adopting 
the “impact rule”). Determining whether someone has suffered physical impact is deter-
mined along a linear, unicentric axis. 
 101. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935) (stating that plain-
tiff must be in “peril of physical impact” and fear for own well-being). Whether the plaintiff 
was or was not in such a zone is determined along a linear axis. 
 102. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 821, 830 (Cal. 1989) (holding that 
mother who did not witness the accident in which her child was injured could not recover 
damages for emotional distress); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 924-25 (Cal. 1968) (holding 
mother who was in close proximity to accident made prima facie case of emotional distress  
against defendant). 
 103. In Thing, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of California stressed the 
need for greater rule formality. Justice Kaufman, concurring, refers to both the majority 
and a dissent as “institutionalized caprice.” 771 P.2d at 831, 835. For an argument that 
foreseeability should be the only limit, see Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort 
Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984). 
 104. Pure economic loss is loss that does not flow parasitically from harm to persons or 
property. Cf. infra note 107 and accompanying text.  
 105. See supra notes 11, 96 and accompanying text. The assessment of damages pre-
sents linear, not polycentric, problems. 
 106. A number of interconnected factors—the remoteness in time and space of the loss-
es from the immediate tangible effects of the accident, the size of the losses compared with 
the values of the tangible harms to persons and property, unusual vulnerability of the vic-
tim to suffering such loss, to name a few—would present a polycentric problem for solution. 
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to persons or property107 and otherwise confining recovery for eco-
nomic loss to claims “channeled” by contractual agreements with the 
direct victims,108 negligence doctrine helps to protect courts and liti-
gants from unadjudicable controversies.
 In similar fashion to the no-duty and limits-on-recovery rules, 
courts recognize several important immunities from fault-based lia-
bility. Although immunities, in theory, do not eliminate the underly-
ing duties of care, functionally they operate, as do no-duty rules, to 
remove difficult polycentric problems from the judicial agenda.109
Governmental immunity, for example, prevents courts from being 
required to review the reasonableness of highly polycentric designs of 
governmental policy and regulation. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), by which the federal governmental generally consents to be 
sued,110 excludes claims based on the exercise of discretionary judg-
ment, thereby preserving the important barrier against broad-based 
judicial review.111 The tort claims that the FTCA allows—typically 
claims based on lower-level operatives’ negligent implementation of 
governmental operations—do not present unmanageable process dif-
ficulties.112 Intrafamily immunities from negligence-based liability, 
although quite different substantively from governmental immunities, 
serve the same process function.113 Courts would face unmanageably 
polycentric problems if they attempted, on a case-by-case basis, to 
                                                                                                                  
 107. See generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 596 (“From a strictly economic 
point of view, impairment of ability to earn may be the most justifiable element of general  
compensatory damages.”). 
 108. Thus, when a negligent actor causes damage to the plaintiff’s person or property 
and the plaintiff consequently incurs economic loss due to a contract with a third party, the 
plaintiff may recover those contract-based damages from the negligent actor who harmed 
his person or property. The third party’s economic losses are said to be “channeled” to the 
negligent actor through the harm to the plaintiff’s person or property. See, e.g., Barber 
Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 109. An immunity prevents a victim from succeeding legally against a wrongdoer. 
When the latter waives the immunity, thereby consenting to be sued, the former may pro-
ceed to recover for the underlying wrong. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. By 
contrast, a privilege eliminates the wrong in the first instance. See generally DOBBS, supra
note 62, at 575-76.  
 110. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006). 
 111. See id. § 2680(a) (stating that liability is precluded for claims based on the “exer-
cise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty”). 
If these claims were allowed, they would present highly polycentric issues. For a discussion 
of state and local governmental immunities, see generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 716-32. 
 112. See Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he design
of a course of governmental action is shielded by the discretionary function exception, 
whereas the implementation of that course of action is not.”); see also DOBBS, supra note 62,  
at 732-37. 
 113. See generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 751-60; HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 62,  
at 405-09. 
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adjust negligence law to take into account the social interests served 
by protecting intrafamily interactions from outside review.114
2.   Specifying the Duty of Care Ex Post 
 It remains to be considered how courts deal with negligence claims 
when ex ante doctrinal adjustments of the sorts just considered are 
not available—when, for a number of substantive reasons, reasona-
bleness-under-the-circumstances survives as the applicable legal 
standard. In these contexts, American courts require the plaintiff in 
a negligence action to perform two related tasks. First, the plaintiff 
must identify specifically one or more precautions that the defendant 
did not take, but should have taken, and show how taking that pre-
caution would have reduced the plaintiff’s harm.115 And second, the 
plaintiff must persuade the tribunal to adopt that solution as its 
own.116 In using this “untaken precaution” approach to solve the fault 
or causation problem, the plaintiff is free to rely on any plausible al-
ternative behavior, including the adoption of new technology availa-
ble at the time the defendant acted in an allegedly negligent manner. 
From the problem-solving perspective described in this analysis, by 
setting the adjudicative agenda in this manner, the plaintiff implicit-
ly transforms the vague standard of reasonable care into a more specif-
ic standard that, once adopted or rejected by the tribunal, determines 
the outcome.117
 Admittedly, in deciding whether or not to embrace the plaintiff’s 
proposed precautionary alternative, to some extent a court must 
solve the underlying problem on its own—the bedrock legal standard 
remains one of unreasonableness, after all. But the plaintiff’s specific 
proposal significantly reduces the open-endedness of the problem by 
limiting the number of constituent elements that the court must con-
sider and by arranging them into a linear sequence in which each 
may be determined, more-or-less, on its own terms. The question be-
comes less one of whether the plaintiff’s proposed alternative course 
of conduct is reasonable in the abstract and more one of whether  
it represents a marginal improvement over the defendant’s actual  
                                                                                                                  
 114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F cmt. h (1977) (“The intimacy of the 
family relationship may also involve some relaxation in the application of the concept of 
reasonable care, particularly in the confines of the home.”). In recent years, courts have 
abrogated several of the intrafamily immunities. DOBBS, supra note 62, at 752, 754-56. 
These abrogations do not expose courts to unmanageable difficulties when either they are 
conditioned on specific factual circumstances or when courts make no efforts to take family 
relationships into account. 
 115. See generally Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989) 
(arguing that the untaken precaution is the central concept of negligence law). 
 116. See id. at 143 n.13. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) 
(2008) makes clear the plaintiff’s burden in this regard. 
 117. In other contexts, private orderers not only set the agenda, they dictate the outcome 
by determining the applicable standard of care. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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conduct.118 The leaps of intuitional judgment left for judge and jury in 
such a regime are not likely to be so great as to exceed the tribunal’s  
institutional capacities. 
 One of the clearest examples of how the untaken-precaution ap-
proach renders the fault-based tort liability system judicially man-
ageable is the development of workable legal standards for determin-
ing defective product designs. With few exceptions, American courts 
require products liability plaintiffs to prove that a specifically-
described reasonable alternative design would have cost-effectively 
reduced or prevented their injury.119 By contrast, when a plaintiff at-
tacks a generic category of products—e.g., cigarettes, firearms, or all-
terrain vehicles—as inherently defective, thereby invoking an aggre-
gative rather than a marginal risk-benefit analysis, courts reject such 
claims as a matter of law, reflecting a combination of concerns over 
preserving judicial manageability and promoting consumer choice.120
 Further evidence supporting the hypothesis that tort doctrine 
avoids polycentric problems is found in the near-universal rejection of 
claims that attack broad patterns of institutional behavior on the 
ground that they are antisocially dangerous. In a manner similar to 
judicial rejection of categorical attacks in product design liability con-
texts, whenever plaintiffs argue that patterns of institutional behav-
ior should be fundamentally redesigned, or that the generic risks in-
herent in those patterns are inimical to social welfare, courts invoke 
“no-duty” rhetoric and deny such claims as a matter of law.121 Thus, 
courts have rejected recent attempts by plaintiffs to invoke radically 
new versions of public nuisance law to condemn entire industries as 
antisocial.122 These so-called “aggregative torts” seek to enlist the ju-
diciary in helping to redesign the American popular culture; and most 
                                                                                                                  
 118. This reduction of a polycentric issue to a marginal comparison between specific 
alternatives is different conceptually from the posing of a polycentric problem in a binary, 
yes-no format. Regarding the latter, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. Regard-
ing the former, see generally David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cas-
es, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239 (1997); David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design 
Defectiveness: “Micro-balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661 (1997).  
 119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (2008). 
 120. Id. § 2 cmt. d (explaining that legislatures and administrative agencies are pre-
ferred over courts when considering the desirability of widely used and consumed prod-
ucts); id. § 2 cmt. e (describing that courts will second-guess market choices only when they 
are irrational). See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the 
American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1263 (1991). 
 121. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068 (N.Y. 2001) 
(action against multiple handgun manufacturers for accidental handgun injuries; “we are 
unconvinced that the duty plaintiffs wish to impose is either reasonable or circumscribed”).  
 122. See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead Indus. 
Ass’n 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008). 
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American courts, largely for the reasons developed in this Article, will 
have none of it.123
 In demonstrating how negligence doctrine transforms highly poly-
centric social problems into clusters of relatively manageable issues, 
this analysis does not argue that the transformations are invariably 
complete and successful. At the end of the day, many fault-based 
claims require fact finders to take intuitive leaps of judgment and to 
exercise discretion in doing so. This is true, to some extent, of all tort 
claims, including the earlier-discussed boundary-crossing claims 
based on intentional wrongs. The point here is not that formal tort 
doctrines do, or ever could, eliminate polycentricity altogether. Rather, 
the point is that they reduce it sufficiently for litigants to receive a 
meaningful day in court. 
C.   How Strict Liability Does Not Require the Exercise of                
Judicial Discretion 
 Because strict liability eliminates the need to determine fault, it pre-
sents no polycentric core of reasonableness-under-the-circumstances.124
Of course, to avoid process difficulties the applicable doctrine must 
identify formally the factual circumstances that trigger strict liabil-
ity. The trick, which strict liability doctrine is careful to accomplish, 
is to define the triggers along unicentric axes. Thus, the core concepts 
of “highly” and “abnormally” dangerous activities are not problemat-
ic125: the former invites a “more-versus-less” calculation along a linear 
axis of relative risk,126 and the latter invites a marginal, unicentric 
comparison with actual, customary patterns of behavior.127 Moreover, 
tort doctrine is not content to rely entirely on these core concepts in 
defining the boundaries of strict liability. Over time, judges as a mat-
ter of law (not juries as a matter of fact) develop specific subcategories 
such as blasting, confining wild animals, and accumulating water in 
artificially maintained reservoirs.128 These strict liability triggers may 
be likened to the specifically defined boundaries of intentional torts 
which, when crossed without privilege, trigger liability without fault.129
                                                                                                                  
 123. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., The Lawlessness of Aggregative Torts,
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329, 330 (2006). 
 124. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Con-
scious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1541 (1973). 
 125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 
(2010) (Abnormally dangerous activity supports strict liability; activity is abnormally dan-
gerous if it creates highly significant risk and is not one of common usage.) Both of these 
elements may be litigated on linear axes. 
 126. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 128. See generally HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 464-65. 
 129. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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 It is also significant that American courts generally require strict 
liability plaintiffs to establish a causal connection between the con-
duct for which the defendant is held liable and the plaintiff’s harm. 
Causation must be established not only in the but-for sense but also 
in the proximate, result-within-the-risk sense.130 Regarding the latter 
proximate causation element, the harm to the plaintiff must be the 
type of harm that one had in mind when defining the strict liability 
trigger in the first instance.131 As long as judges begin such a proxi-
mate cause analysis by identifying the specific risks that played a 
role in the initial assignment of responsibility to the defendant, 
courts remain within their limits. Were courts to approach this task 
by asking more broadly whether holding the defendant liable for a 
certain type of harm would further the overarching objectives of the 
civil liability system, they would approach and arguably exceed the 
limits of their institutional competence.132
D.   Enterprise Liability’s False Promise of Adjudicability:  
Why Such Claims Have Never Gained Traction 
 Some tort scholars, invoking normative analyses, have urged the 
adoption by courts of enterprise liability, in which commercial enter-
prises would be strictly liable in tort for the harm their activities 
cause.133 Such a system would presumably shield courts from trying 
to solve the polycentric problem of how much care enterprises must 
exercise. However, as explained earlier in Part III.C., supra, for strict 
liability to remain adjudicable the threshold circumstances that trig-
ger liability must be defined with sufficient specificity to render 
manageable the task of deciding which activities are strictly liable for 
which sorts of harms. Regarding the “which activities?” question,  
                                                                                                                  
 130. The result-within-the-risk limitation is captured in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2010). 
 131. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).  
 132. A recent decision in the Supreme Court of New Jersey has arguably exceeded 
these limits in adopting an approach to determining whether the intentional-wrong excep-
tion to the worker compensation bar applies on the facts of individual cases. See Laidlow v. 
Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884 (N.J. 2002). In what the court terms the “context prong,” 
trial judges are to determine whether the employer’s imposition of risk on the injured em-
ployee was beyond what the legislature could have contemplated as the “simple facts of 
industrial life” when limiting employees to their statutory rights to compensation. See id.
at 898. 
 133. See, e.g., VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMOND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIA-
BILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); Steven P. 
Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liabil-
ity, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993); Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability 
and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285 (2001). This discussion focuses 
on common law tort liability, not statutory no-fault compensation. Cf. KENNETH S. ABRA-
HAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 260-63 (3d ed. 2007).. Because statutory 
schemes would presumably be specific and structured, they could avoid adjudicability prob-
lems. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability,
41 MD. L. REV. 659 (1982). 
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enterprise liability proposals presumably include all commercial en-
terprises.134 Thus, the threshold task of determining which defend-
ants are subject to strict liability would be manageable enough.135
 However, regarding the “all the harm they cause” issue, because a 
broad-based enterprise liability system presumably would not select 
among commercial enterprises based on the uniqueness of the risks 
they create, the applicable doctrine would provide no adequate basis 
for establishing a logical link between any given commercial enter-
prise’s activities and the harm those activities cause.136 Thus, the only 
type of causation that a plaintiff could be required to prove would be 
actual, but-for-the-activity causation. In any given situation a fairly 
large number of enterprises would satisfy that criterion—most acci-
dents are the result of many but-for causes.137 It follows that courts 
would be required, presumably applying overarching policies under 
an open-ended scheme of enterprise liability, to exercise broad discre-
tion in deciding which commercial enterprises should be responsible 
for which harms.138 These would be complex, value-laden tasks that 
would clearly threaten to push courts beyond their institutional ca-
pabilities. Thus, from the perspective in this analysis, it is not sur-
prising that academic proposals for broad-based enterprise liability 
have not gained traction in American courtrooms.139
IV.   THE CONSTITUTIVE DIMENSIONS OF TORT: HOW A SYSTEM OF 
PUBLIC RISK REGULATION DELEGATES PROBLEM-SOLVING
RESPONSIBILITIES TO PRIVATE MANAGERS
 While the discussion that follows begins by examining explicit 
contractual modifications of tort, it goes further to reveal that tort 
law’s constitutive dimensions extend well beyond the contracting-out 
phenomenon. Thus, in addition to deferring passively to contract, tort 
law actively delegates authority to private problem solvers in two 
important ways that are developed in the sections that follow. First, 
                                                                                                                  
 134. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability,
55 MD. L. REV. 1190 (1996).  
 135. Admittedly, the concept of “commercial enterprise” is fuzzy around the edges. But 
presumably courts would work out adequately specific boundaries over time. 
 136. Cf. supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 137. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV.
377, 391 (2002). 
 138. Id. at 396 (arguing lack of doctrinal focus would lead to “conceptual chaos”). 
 139. Thus, in the products liability context, courts have never imposed strict liability 
for harm caused by the generic risks of product designs. See Henderson, supra note 124, at 
1554 & n.98. For an analysis of how courts replaced earlier enterprise liability systems 
with negligence law to give American industry breathing room in the second half of the 
nineteenth century see generally Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault 
in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225, 228-30 (1971). For a discussion of whether more limited 
statutory schemes of no-fault compensation may be developed in the future see ABRAHAM,
supra note 133, at 260-63. 
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by invoking no-duty rules and immunities, tort law explicitly places 
certain areas of conduct beyond its regulative reach, thereby defer-
ring them to mostly private systems of risk management. And se-
cond, regarding those areas of conduct retained within its reach, tort 
law often delegates, on a piecemeal basis, the setting of the relevant 
tort standards to individual risk managers. Both of these active 
modes of deferral—system-wide and piecemeal—may be said to pro-
mote private ordering and consumer choice.140 But only in connection 
with the second—piecemeal delegation—do the externally estab-
lished standards become tort standards, thus subjecting noncompli-
ant actors to tort liability. Moreover, while in both modes of active 
deferral many of the adjustments occur ex ante, before the fact of the 
plaintiff’s injury, they may also occur ex post when courts require tort 
plaintiffs to specify how the defendants breached the relevant gen-
eral duties of care. A previous discussion in Part III, supra, explains 
how this ex post specification requirement avoids polycentricity, help-
ing to render negligence claims adjudicable. Now this Part explains 
how it empowers plaintiffs to set the substantive agenda in negli-
gence litigation, thereby steering the regulatory dimension of tort in 
the direction of the plaintiff’s, rather than the court’s, choosing.141
 Before considering the different ways in which tort doctrine dele-
gates responsibility to private managers, it would be helpful to con-
sider briefly why it makes such delegations in the first instance. One 
important reason has been identified: private individuals and small 
collaborative groups are on the whole more capable solvers of com-
plex planning and design problems than are courts. But beyond this 
consideration of comparative advantage lies a strong normative tra-
dition in American law and culture: that problems with a significant 
private dimension should, whenever private problem solvers can be 
trusted fairly to consider the interests of would-be victims, be solved 
by private, not public, actors.142 This Article does not argue norma-
tively that private ordering should be promoted. Rather, it observes 
                                                                                                                  
 140. See generally Mark A. Geistfeld, The Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability,
74 BROOK. L. REV. 781 (2009). 
 141. With rare exceptions the trial will focus on the untaken precaution(s) upon which 
the plaintiff chooses to rely. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 142. This commitment to private ordering is most often voiced in connection with the 
constitutive powers conferred by contract law. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and 
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941) (“Among the basic conceptions of contract law the 
most pervasive and indispensable is the principle of private autonomy.”); Samuel Williston, 
Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 367 (1921). (“[I]t was a corollary of the philoso-
phy of freedom and individualism that the law ought to extend the sphere and enforce the 
obligation of contract.”). The underlying assumption is that contracting parties can protect 
their own interests. Cf. infra note 149 and accompanying text.  
248 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:221
empirically that the American legal system does, in fact, place signif-
icant value on the delegation of decisionmaking to private orderers.143
A.   Ex Ante Delegations of Risk-Management Responsibility 
 The subsections that follow distinguish between passive deferrals 
and active delegations of regulative responsibility. As will be ex-
plained, passive deferrals involve private risk-management decisions 
that the tort system neither initiates nor encourages, but rather re-
views for fairness and for the most part accepts as legally effective. 
Most examples of passive deferral involve contracting out, in which 
the tort system bows to contractual overrides. By contrast, tort  
doctrine actively invites private decisionmaking by employing no-
duty rules and tort immunities to delegate regulative responsibility 
and by explicitly incorporating into its duty structure interparty 
modifications, short of formal agreements, based on mutual consent 
and customary conduct.144
1.   Passive Deferrals: Allowing Contract to Override Tort 
 When actors anticipate future tort disputes, they often agree to 
modify the relevant tort standards and to adjust potential liabilities. 
As long as the parties are reasonably competent, have adequate ac-
cess to relevant factual information, are in positions to act effectively 
on that information, and do not reach agreements that are objectively 
unconscionable, courts will give legal effect to such agreements.145 As 
indicated earlier, the tort system does not actively encourage such 
arrangements by leaving gaps in tort doctrine, but passively accepts 
contractual overrides when they occur. Indeed, many insist that con-
tract comes first, so-to-speak—that the primary function of tort law is 
to provide baseline default rules that apply only when deal-making in 
                                                                                                                  
 143. See HART & SACKS, supra note 41, at 286 (“The overwhelming proportion of the 
things which happen and do not happen in American society . . . are the result of decisions 
which people make in the exercise of a private discretion, accorded to them by official 
recognition of a private liberty.”). 
 144. It could be argued that, by standing ready to enforce formal contractual depar-
tures from tort obligations, courts thereby actively encourage such departures. But even if 
the passive/active distinction is one of degree, this analysis sees a difference between 
courts deferring to contractual overrides of existing tort doctrine, on the one hand, and tort 
doctrine leaving regulatory gaps that presumably only private ordering can fill, on the 
other. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. Jules Coleman draws a similar distinc-
tion between gaps in contracts (that contract doctrine fills) and failures to contract in the 
first instance (which tort doctrine fills). See Jules L. Coleman, Contracts and Torts, 12 LAW &
PHIL. 71, 75 (1993). 
 145. See generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 541-42; HENDERSON ET. AL., supra note 62, 
at 383-84. Courts do not allow such agreements to adversely affect the rights of third  
parties. See DOBBS, supra note 62, at 768. 
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the marketplace is either not possible or not desired by the affected 
parties, or when such deal-making fails of its purpose.146
 Market failures in this context occur most often when either 
transaction costs are too great147 or one of the interested parties is 
uninformed or lacks the capacity to enter enforceable deals.148 Re-
garding whether the parties have the capacity to contract out of tort, 
two fact patterns dominate. First, a majority of instances in which all 
sides are competent to protect their interests involve commercial ac-
tors allocating future economic gains and losses resulting from acci-
dents that may occur in the course of their joint business activities.149
And second, a majority of instances in which courts will not enforce 
the exculpatory agreements involve “David and Goliath” circum-
stances in which commercial enterprises try to reduce or eliminate 
their tort liabilities to individual victims.150 In the first instance, con-
tract could be said to rescue competent actors from tort; in the se-
cond, tort could be said to rescue incompetent actors from contract. 
Of course, when the parties agree to raise the relevant duties of care, 
courts are less concerned with protecting incompetent actors. Thus, 
almost without exception, courts accept and enforce agreements  
that seek to expand, rather than to contract, liability for accidentally  
caused injuries.151
 It remains to consider whether actors may contract out of the judi-
cial procedures by which tort law is traditionally administered. Alt-
hough some American courts during the early development of so-
called “alternative dispute resolution” methodology balked at the 
prospect of parties ousting the judiciary of jurisdiction to hear civil 
disputes,152 the tide has turned in recent years. As long as the earlier-
described criteria for allowing contracting out of tort are satisfied, 
courts are content to allow private actors to agree to submit their tort 
                                                                                                                  
 146. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 144, at 75. 
 147. When the parties involved in an accident have no practical opportunity to interact 
before the accident, tort law solves the coordination problem that the parties would pre-
sumably have solved if they had been able to interact. In the absence of transaction costs, 
tort law arguably would not be needed. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960). 
 148. See generally HENDERSON ET. AL., supra note 62, at 57-59, 383-84. 
 149. See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 
641, 643 (Cal. 1968) (indemnification agreement concerning future property damage); 
Brown v. Two Exch. Plaza Partners, 556 N.E.2d 430, 432-33 (N.Y. 1990) (indemnification 
agreement regarding future personal injury). 
 150. See, e.g., Sweeney v. City of Bettendorf, 762 N.W.2d 873 (Iowa 2009); Provoncha v. Vt. 
Motocross Ass’n, 974 A.2d 1261, 1263 (Vt. 2009). 
 151. See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 410 (Wash. 1932) (discussing ex-
press warranty); HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 214-16 (discussing promise to effect 
medical cure); supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing waiver of immunity). 
 152. See generally Tom Cullinan, Contracting for an Expanded Scope of Judicial Re-
view in Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REV. 395, 406-08 (1998) (describing early judi-
cial hostility to alternative dispute resolution agreements). 
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disputes to alternative dispute resolution methodologies.153 Under more 
ambitious academic proposals, the parties to foreseeable but fairly 
narrowly defined tort disputes would agree ex ante to replace the rel-
evant liability standards and judicial procedures with privately de-
signed and funded, no-fault systems of recovery.154
2.   Active Delegations: Invitations to Private Risk Managers  
Imbedded in Tort Doctrine 
 In the preceding Part, private actors take the initiative by con-
tracting out of tort. In this Part, tort doctrine takes the initiative by 
invoking no-duty rules, immunities, and explicit deferrals to private 
ordering, thereby inviting private risk managers to fill the regula-
tive gaps. Subsection (a), infra, deals with doctrinal delegations to 
private management systems;155 subsection (b) deals with deferrals to 
individual decisionmakers.  
(a)   Delegations to Private Risk-Management Systems: No-Duty 
Rules, Tort Immunities, and Reliance on Custom 
 American tort law includes high-profile, no-duty rules that deny 
liability in various circumstances where one would, on general prin-
ciples, expect liability to be forthcoming.156 Part III.B, supra, identi-
fies some of these rules to show how courts frame tort doctrine to 
avoid presenting polycentric problems. This Part explains how tort 
law uses no-duty rules to delegate relevant management responsibili-
ties to private decisionmakers. A good example occurs in the area of 
products liability, where courts delegate to product purchasers much 
of the responsibility, by means of a no-duty rule, for deciding whether 
to adopt optional safety devices.157 Perhaps the most notorious of 
these rules denies a general duty of care to rescue strangers from 
peril.158 Whatever other substantive and procedural objectives this 
                                                                                                                  
 153. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 154. See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell, A “Neo No-Fault” Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident 
Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985). 
 155. Judicial deferrals to legislative regulation are not included because legislation 
trumps court-made tort law in any event, and because Part IV focuses on the constitutive
dimensions of tort, which are by definition limited to private ordering. 
 156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7(b) (2010) (policy-based, no-duty exceptions to general duty of care). See generally HEN-
DERSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 316 (heading in negligence chapter of torts casebook titled 
“Special Instances of Nonliability for Harmful Consequences that Are . . . Foreseeable”). 
This is the “exemption” sense of the duty concept as developed in John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law,
54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 718-21 (2001) (certain classes of actors do not owe certain classes of 
victims the same general duty of reasonable care ordinarily owed by all to all).  
 157. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Optional Safety Devices: 
Delegating Responsibility for Product Safety to the Market (2013) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
 158. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.  
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no-duty rule may serve,159 it clearly defers the relevant behavior-
management responsibilities for encouraging rescue to the broad sys-
tem of social and cultural interests that promote bonds of interper-
sonal caring among members of society.160 Indeed, observers have ar-
gued that public law regulation supports these interpersonal bonds 
and natural impulses to rescue most effectively by not attempting to 
promote them by threatening penalties.161
 The general rule that tortfeasors are not liable for the emotional 
upset of bystander-strangers who witness accidental injuries to pri-
mary victims, or for the upset of relatives and friends of primary vic-
tims who later learn of the injuries to their loved ones, functionally 
parallels the general no-duty-to-rescue rule.162 By denying a tort 
remedy to most bystander victims who suffer loss in the form of se-
vere emotional distress, tort law defers responsibility for addressing 
and managing those losses to the private mechanisms by which indi-
viduals and social groups traditionally cope with the psychological 
aftermath of emotional trauma and personal loss.163 Observe that in 
this context the focus is on managing situations ex post to reduce the 
extent of the victim’s losses rather than, as with the rescue rule, 
managing the would-be loss-avoider’s conduct ex ante to avoid acci-
dental losses in the first instance. But the two no-duty rules are func-
tionally similar in that they both shield courts from polycentric prob-
lems164 and they both delegate risk- and loss-management responsi-
bilities to systems of private ordering. 
 The no-duty tort rule that disallows recovery for pure economic 
loss165 self-consciously delegates risk management responsibilities to 
                                                                                                                  
 159. See generally Henderson, Process Constraints, supra note 92. 
 160. Lon Fuller distinguishes between legal duties and human aspiration. Instead of 
bludgeoning actors with the former, the no-duty-to-rescue rule “invit[es] us to join them in 
realizing a pattern of life . . . worthy of human nature[.]” LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW 10 (rev. ed. 1969). For a treatment of how cultural processes reinforce natural tenden-
cies to behave altruistically see Felix Warneken & Michael Tomasello, The Roots of Human 
Altruism, 100 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 455 (2009). 
 161. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 160, at 5-6, 9, 27-28; William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of 
Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).  
 162. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 163. In Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828-29 (Cal. 1989), the Supreme Court of 
California justified a formal, restrictive approach to bystander recovery in part on the 
ground that emotional distress can be dealt with adequately by private coping mecha-
nisms. Although the court acknowledges that such distress is a serious form of personal 
injury, the majority opinion observes that it “is an unavoidable aspect of the ‘human condi-
tion,’ ” concluding that it “is an intangible condition experienced by most persons . . . at 
some time during their lives.” Id. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort 
Law: Themes of Constraint, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1197, 1206 (2009) (referring to the 
requirement that to be actionable, intentional infliction of emotion distress must be ex-
treme and outrageous, the author observes that “putting up with occasional conduct that is 
harsh and hurtful is part of the normal course of life”). 
 164. See discussions supra Part III. 
 165. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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the constitutive dimensions of contract. As observed earlier in con-
nection with the contracting-out phenomenon, most instances in 
which plaintiffs succeed in recovering in contract for economic loss 
arise out of commercial dealings.166 When contract remedies are not 
available to plaintiffs, either because the parties never made a deal 
or because their loss-allocating efforts succumb to contract law de-
fenses, courts refuse a tort remedy.167 Another example of tort doc-
trine delegating responsibility for risk management to private deci-
sionmakers involves liability for generic risks inhering categorically 
in allegedly defective product designs. When such risks cannot be 
eliminated by reasonable design modifications and are obvious, gener-
ally known, or adequately warned against, courts refuse to impose de-
sign liability however great or arguably unreasonable those risks may 
be.168 When courts reach these conclusions, it is often quite clear that 
they are deferring to consumers’ choices in the products marketplace.169
 American courts adopt an equally deferential approach to private 
ordering when a member of a private organization—business, social, 
or otherwise—seeks to recover in tort against a fellow member based 
on conduct to which the organization’s private, internal regulations 
apply. Consistent with their responses to contracting out170 and in-
trafamily tort disputes,171 courts generally defer to the private regu-
lations when they call for a result different from that called for by 
tort.172 This “let them work it out themselves” attitude extends to 
the internal management of business organizations. The so-called 
“business judgment rule” delegates to corporate management pri-
mary responsibility for making decisions that may adversely affect 
                                                                                                                  
 166. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., Adamo v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 900 N.E.2d 966, 967-69 
(N.Y. 2008) (plaintiff attacked defendant’s cigarettes with a proposed alternative design 
that smokers clearly would not accept; court rejected the claim as a matter of law, conclud-
ing that it was the functional equivalent of an impermissible, categorical attack on ciga-
rettes). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. d, e; Hender-
son & Twerski, supra note 120. 
 169. See, e.g., Adamo, 900 N.E.2d 966; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 2 cmt. f (1998) (“[T]he range of consumer choice among products are factors that may be 
taken into account” in determining whether a product design is defective.). See generally
Geistfeld, supra note 140. Courts will even allow purchasers to choose among optional safe-
ty features when the purchasers are not, themselves, the ones at risk of injury. See, e.g.,
Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 719 N.E. 2d 679 (N.Y. 1999). See generally Thomas 
E. Powell, II, Products Liability and Optional Safety Equipment—Who Knows More?, 73 
NEB. L. REV. 844 (1994). 
 170. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 113-14; infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 1 A.3d 678, 695 (N.J. 2010). (deferring to an 
exculpatory clause in a gym club contract on the ground that private arrangements should  
be upheld). 
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shareholders, and courts refuse to second-guess those decisions when 
made in good faith.173
 Although immunities from liability are conceptually distinguisha-
ble from no-duty rules,174 from the functional perspective of this anal-
ysis they serve essentially the same purpose. Intrafamily immunities, 
still recognized by most states, are good examples. When close family 
members—spouses, parents, and unemancipated children—bring tort 
actions against one another, American courts recognize immunities 
from liability that delegate risk management authority to the family 
unit or to members of the unit,175 much as no-duty rules defer to social 
and business organizations regarding the potentially tortious interac-
tions of their members.176 With regard to intrafamily tort actions, 
courts have expressed concern that such actions, if sincere, disrupt 
family cohesion177 and, if insincere, encourage collusion and fraud.178
But on the view taken here, many intrafamily immunities also pro-
mote private ordering for its own sake—who knows better than the 
family itself how best to manage family affairs? And who can better be 
trusted fairly to control intrafamily risks? Governmental immunities 
function in much the same manner as intrafamily immunities;179 how-
ever, they are not emphasized in this analysis because they involve 
deferrals to public, rather than to private, risk-management systems. 
 Charitable immunities are more difficult to explain from the prob-
lem-solving perspective. For starters, harking back to an earlier dis-
cussion in Part III, supra, tort actions against charities present no 
more likelihood of being unadjudicable than do tort actions general-
ly.180 Moreover, from the constitutive perspective in this Part, no basis 
                                                                                                                  
 173. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A board of 
directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be 
disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. A court . . . will not 
substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.”). See generally S. 
Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979); Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV.
83 (2004).  
 174. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
 177. See generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 756 nn.23-24 and accompanying text. Of 
course, when a family member commits a harmful intentional tort on another member, this 
substantive, family harmony rationale seems weak. 
 178. Id. Reflecting hostility toward immunities, Dobbs argues that fraud is no more 
likely in this context than in others. 
 179. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Besides avoiding polycentricity, gov-
ernmental immunities arguably avoid excessive interference by the judicial branch with 
the legislative and executive branches. For an argument that governmental immunity  
is not supportable on separation-of-powers grounds see Erwin Chemerinsky, Against  
Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1217-19 (2001). 
 180. By contrast, tort actions against governmental agencies are likely to include at-
tacks on polycentric policy decisions, see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text, and 
actions among family members raise polycentric problems when they attempt, as they 
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exists for believing that charities know better, or can be better trust-
ed, to manage the risks of harming third party victims than nonchar-
itable actors and enterprises generally.181 Thus, from the outset, the 
main motive underlying charitable immunities appears to have been 
substantive—to subsidize charitable activities by protecting them 
from the financial burdens of tort liabilities.182 With the development 
of the modern liability insurance industry,183 this subsidization ra-
tionale has lost much of its power and, coincidental with this loss, 
judicial recognition of charitable immunities has steadily declined.184
 Negligence law defers to private risk management systems in an-
other important way. Regarding defendants engaged in providing 
professional services—e.g., doctors and lawyers—courts measure 
their conduct against the standards of care established by the profes-
sion rather than by independent, judicially derived standards of rea-
sonableness.185 Thus, based in part on an assumption that profes-
sionals act in the best interests of their clients, the professions estab-
lish the safety standards by which their individual members are 
judged, and conformance to those customs bars liability.186 The level 
of trust that tort law thereby places in the professions does not ex-
tend to industries and other nonprofessional risk management sys-
tems, whose customs do not establish the relevant legal standards.187
That is not to say that industry custom carries no weight in negli-
gence litigation. Evidence of conformance to custom is admissible and 
presumably influences triers of fact in favor of defendants.188 And ev-
idence of departure from industry custom is believed to be even more 
influential.189 But courts do not routinely confer controlling authority 
on customs adopted by nonprofessional risk management systems. 
                                                                                                                  
must, to accommodate the special values within particular family unit, see supra note 114 
and accompanying text. 
 181. Thus, unlike the other immunities, no process reasons exist for courts to delegate 
regulative authority to charities. 
 182. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 405. 
 183. For a discussion on this development see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY 
CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 14-38 (2008). 
 184. See, e.g., Picher v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 974 A.2d 286, 294, 295 (Me. 
2009) (conducting a thorough review of history, concluding that charitable immunity “has 
generally been acknowledged as bankrupt”). See generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 763; 
Note, The Quality of Mercy: “Charitable Torts” and Their Continuing Immunity, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1382 (1987). 
 185. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 187. For a leading decision see The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 662 (1932). 
 188. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 13(a) (2010); DOBBS, supra note 62, at 393-99. 
 189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 13(b) cmt. c (2010). 
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(b)   Delegations to Individual Managers: Informal, Consent-Based 
Modifications of Duty 
 Consent plays a larger role in tort than simply supplying an af-
firmative defense to claims of intentional tort. In fact, the absence of 
consent is arguably the single most important element in the defini-
tion of what makes intentional boundary-crossings wrongful.190 To be 
sure, the so-called “glass cage” doctrine limits an actor’s power to de-
fine her own personal boundaries.191 But within those limits, the 
power to withhold consent leaves it to individuals to define the duties 
owed by others to refrain from violating the boundaries of person-
hood. Moreover, in the context of negligence, analogous to the role of 
consent in connection with intentional torts, assumption of the risk 
confers lawmaking power on individuals. In what courts refer to as 
its “primary sense,” assumption of the risk allows actors to modify 
their reciprocal rights and duties through ex ante interactions in 
which the actors tacitly agree to accept tailor-made adjustments of 
the relevant general standards of care.192 Were the parties to capture 
these same adjustments in a formal agreement, one could speak  
of their “contracting out” of off-the-rack tort liability.193 In effect,  
assumption of the risk in the primary sense accomplishes the same 
objective, albeit less formally.  
B.   Ex Post Delegations of Risk-Management Responsibility: Untaken 
Precautions and Settlements 
1.   The Plaintiff’s Power to Set the Trial Agenda: Identifying  
Untaken Precautions  
 As explained in Part III, supra, one of the important ways that 
courts avoid the necessity of addressing negligence claims under 
vague reasonableness standards is by requiring plaintiffs to identify 
specifically the precaution that the defendant failed to take ex ante
which, if taken, would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff’s inju-
ry ex post.194 This section follows up on that earlier discussion and 
observes that this “untaken precaution” requirement also constitutes 
an important delegation of power to tort plaintiffs pursuing negligence 
claims. By assigning to the plaintiff the power to choose which un-
                                                                                                                  
 190. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. See generally Geistfeld, supra note 140, 
at 781 nn.1-6 and accompanying text. 
 191. See, e.g., McCracken v. Sloan, 252 S.E.2d 250, 251-52 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) 
(plaintiff not allowed to erect a “glass cage” in order to convert passive smoking claim into  
offensive battery). 
 192. See, e.g., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 711 (Cal. 1992). (finding that plaintiff’s 
continued willingness to participate in increasingly violent touch football game lowered the 
duty of care owed to her by fellow participants). See generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 540-41. 
 193. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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taken precaution(s) to focus on at trial, the tort system is not delegat-
ing the power to regulate, given that the plaintiff cannot unilaterally 
impose his choice on the defendant. Rather, the system is delegating 
to the plaintiff the power to set an important element of the trial 
agenda—the power significantly to limit proof and argument regard-
ing the nature of the defendant’s breach. To be sure, the defendant 
may dispute the plaintiff’s proposed agenda—for example, by arguing 
that the superficially attractive, low-cost precaution proposed by the 
plaintiff would not have prevented all of the harms that a reasonable 
person would have anticipated.195 Nevertheless, the agenda proposed 
by the plaintiff is presumptively controlling and carries great 
weight.196 The plaintiff may ultimately lose the war by failing to 
prove defendant’s fault; but he gets to choose the terrain over which 
the relevant battles will be fought. 
 Lest the false impression be created that agenda-setting is solely 
the plaintiff’s prerogative in negligence litigation, observe that tort 
law delegates to defendants parallel agenda-setting powers in con-
nection with those issues that defendants may or may not choose to 
raise at trial. An example of current interest relates to the issue of 
plaintiff’s contributory fault. Before the arrival of comparative negli-
gence, contributory fault was an affirmative defense and the defend-
ant had the choice of whether or not to raise that issue.197 However, 
in this era of comparative negligence,198 plaintiffs who pursue mar-
ginally plausible claims may prefer to confess their own fault and  
let the jury allocate percentages of responsibility rather than risk a 
jury finding that the defendant was totally free from blame—better 
                                                                                                                  
 195. Employing hindsight, often the plaintiff can identify a low-cost precaution that a 
jury could find would have prevented or reduced the plaintiff’s harm. The defendant typi-
cally responds, that from the standpoint of foresight, a reasonable person would have as-
sumed that a more sweeping, higher-cost precaution was necessary to prevent injury, and 
that the risk of suffering harm was not sufficiently great to warrant such higher costs of 
precaution. See, e.g., Washington v. La. Power & Light Co., 555 So. 2d 1350, 1354 (La. 
1990) (involving the family of an electrocuted homeowner who claimed that utility should 
have buried or insulated high voltage wires in decedent’s back yard; ruling for utility as a 
matter of law, the court held that, to save all persons in decedent’s position, the entire 
system would require safeguarding). Id. 
 196. See Grady, supra note 115, at 144 (“[B]y selecting an untaken precaution . . . the 
plaintiff defines the analysis that everyone else will use.”). In Washington v. La. Power & 
Light Co., 555 So. 2d 1350 (La. 1990), the plaintiffs attempted to convince the court that 
the decedent’s situation was sufficiently unique that a reasonable electric utility would 
have treated him with greater care. That effort was unsuccessful, but it is clear that the de-
fendant utility bore the burden of overturning the plaintiff’s assertion of uniqueness—the 
court goes to great length to justify its conclusion that, as a matter of law, the undertaken 
precaution urged by the plaintiffs was inappropriately modest. Id. at 1353-55. 
 197. See generally DOBBS, supra note 62, at 494 n.5 and accompanying text. 
 198. See generally William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 
(1953); Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189 
(1950); Daniel Orr, The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote, 20 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 119 (1991). 
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to recover something rather than nothing, as it were. The question of 
law in that context is whether the plaintiff may raise the issue of her 
own fault if the defendant, sensing the likelihood of a total victory for 
defendant if comparative fault is not an issue, chooses not to raise 
it.199 In a manner parallel to that involving untaken precautions, 
the issue here is one of deciding who has the power to set the rele-
vant agenda. The point in both contexts is that agenda-setting is an 
important aspect of the American system of adversary justice and 
that delegating the relevant choices to private litigants gives them 
significant ex post powers of risk management. 
2.   The Plaintiff’s Power to Decide Whether to Pursue a Claim  
 It remains to consider the most basic ex post choice of all in the 
context of American tort litigation—the injured plaintiff’s choice of 
whether or not to pursue a legal claim in the first instance and 
whether, having pursued a claim, to settle with the defendant. From 
the perspective adopted in this analysis, it is remarkable that an os-
tensibly public system of risk regulation would delegate to private 
decisionmakers the power to determine in the first instance whether 
or not that system will address individual instances of wrongdoing. 
The normative implications of this most basic delegation to private 
ordering, especially from a corrective justice standpoint, have cap-
tured the attention of tort scholars.200 From the problem-solving per-
spective advanced in this Article, this would appear to constitute the 
most fundamental delegation to private ordering of them all. 
V. CONCLUSION
From an instrumental perspective, law in general and tort law in 
particular are problem-solving enterprises. Even if one believes that 
corrective justice is tort’s ultimate, noninstrumental objective, one 
must be concerned with the means of achieving that objective. Viable 
legal standards must be created and maintained, claims must be 
prepared and processed, and appropriate outcomes must be reached. 
All of these elements necessitate solving coordination problems of one 
sort or another. On the surface, the tort system would appear to fea-
ture courts as the primary problem solvers, subject to powers given to 
                                                                                                                  
 199. Comparative negligence is universally treated as an affirmative defense. See, e.g.,
ABRAHAM, supra note 132, at 151-60; DOBBS, supra note 62, at 503-34. Thus, one could 
present the issue as one of whether the plaintiff may raise an affirmative defense. For a 
decision allowing the plaintiff to raise the issue when the defendant chooses not to raise it, 
see Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Arnitz, 933 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). 
 200. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of 
Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 82-90 (1998). See also ABRAHAM, supra note 139, at 14-16 (“[A]s 
the connection between injurer and victim becomes less direct, corrective justice seems less 
relevant.”); Symposium, Civil Recourse Theory, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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private actors to contract out of tort-based obligations. On this view, 
courts appear to solve social problems not only when they create law 
ex ante, but also when they apply it ex post. Despite first appearanc-
es, however, courts are not institutionally suited to solving complex 
social problems. Most of the underlying substantive problems with 
which tort law is concerned—complex problems of coordinating hu-
man behavior—are many-centered, or polycentric. Their constituent 
elements are interconnected, so that a tentative decision regarding 
any single element affects all the other elements. Individuals and 
small groups solve polycentric problems by exercising experience-
based discretion. But courts do not ordinarily exercise broad discre-
tion, partly because of traditional views regarding political unac-
countability and partly to ensure litigants a meaningful opportunity 
to participate in guiding courts to appropriate outcomes. Even when 
courts make law as part of the evolutionary common law process, 
they do so only marginally, considering only one relatively small, 
non-polycentric piece of the larger puzzle at a time. 
 Two important conclusions flow from the fact that private actors 
can solve social problems that courts cannot solve nearly so effective-
ly. First, the regulative dimensions of tort doctrine have evolved in 
ways that largely avoid giving courts the sorts of open-ended prob-
lems that are beyond their institutional capabilities. And second, the 
constitutive dimensions of tort delegate to private risk managers ma-
jor responsibilities for solving those same problems. This Article has 
examined the breadth of tort doctrine to support both of these conclu-
sions. The analysis is descriptive rather than normative. It does not 
argue that tort law should necessarily conform to the patterns it 
identifies; rather, it demonstrates that tort law does conform in ways 
that reflect the comparative problem-solving capabilities of courts 
and private decisionmakers. One need not take sides normatively  
to gain understanding from this analysis. Thus, a major value of the 
problem-solving perspective may reside in its capacity to explain  
tort law without the necessity of employing overarching philosophical 
abstractions to try to justify it. 
